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ter of his thought. The elaboration of 
this intuition would be a most instruc-
tive undertaking. 
Some of my reasons for this hunch 
connect with my earlier remarks. If the 
dialectic is conceived methodologically 
as a manner of thinking that may be 
employed in the "scientific" investiga-
tion of human affairs (which is my in-
clination, and if space allowed I would 
have mentioned the specific concep-
tual content that defines it), then such 
a dialectical interpretation would pro-
vide the answer to the first issue I 
raised, namely, what is Mosca's method 
or approach, as distinct from the specif-
ics of his doctrines. Second, since, as I 
have argued elsewhere, the dialectic 
defines the deep structure of Gramsci' s 
thought in the Notebooks, this would 
add a methodological similarity to the 
substantive one postulated above to 
exist between the two thinkers. 
In conclusion, Albertoni's work is 
useful, valuable, and welcome for the 
information and accounts it provides. 
But it is even more significant for the 
insights it indirectly suggests, and for 
the future research it challenges us to 
do, those of us who are so impertinent 
as to complain about its omissions and 
blemishes. 
MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO 
University of Nevada-Las Vegas 
Senso e paradosso 
By Emilio Garroni 
Bari: Laterza, 1986 
The definition of "what philosophy 
is" and what kind of knowledge it 
legitimizes is a problem unresolved 
and, to a certain extent, unresolvable. 
If philosophy is just a form of literary 
discourse-as has been stated-we still 
do not know what literariness is. 
Maybe philosophy is, more properly, 
the old name given to the unlimited 
process of interpretation that charac-
terizes the human enterprise in his-
tory. In one word: itis "hermeneutics." 
We can also ask in what sense philo-
sophical knowledge is different from 
scientific knowledge. Is the task of the 
philosopher to build, with "archaeo-
logical" or "genealogical" methods, a 
"history of the ideas"? Or is the pur-
pose of philosophy to build a metalan-
guage, a "superscience" of some sort, 
able to re-elaborate the results of the 
different sciences on a higher level? 
To explore and determine what is the 
"object" of the philosophical enter-
prise is the main purpose of the most 
recent book by Emilio Garroni. In it he 
investigates the nature of philosophical 
questioning more than philosophy as a 
discipline or a type of knowledge. Gar-
roni, professor of Aesthetics at Rome 
University, in recent years has increas-
ingly concentrated his attention on au-
thors like Kant (and especially the 
Critique of Judgment), Wittgenstein, and 
Heidegger in order to understand in 
what sense answers to questions con-
cerning the foundations of the philo-
sophical enterprise are possible. And 
if the nature of "general" philosophical 
knowledge is a problem, an even big-
ger difficulty surrounds the status of 
the so-called special philosophies, 
among which Aesthetics seems to suf-
fer a paradoxically weak position. A 
close reading of its history, since the 
first "modem" use of the word by 
Baumgarten, shows that Aesthetics 
has been, since the beginning, a 
"philosophy of art dissatisfied with it-
self." The dominion of the "aesthetic" 
as an adjective is nowadays so large 
and vague that Garroni needs to begin 
his book by asking himself if, perhaps, 
Aesthetics is a philosophy "without ob-
ject," and if, in that case, it is ready to 
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dissolve into other disciplines . 
But this is only Garroni's first move. 
His second move , in a book written in 
a very careful style which tends to 
avoid a "difficult" and "specialized" 
terminology, is to try to understand in 
what sense these questions about Aes-
thetics and Philosophy go beyond the 
purely academic and touch upon more 
essential preoccupations. The shift is a 
philosophical one : in Kant's terms, a 
"transcendental" one. These questions 
about philosophy-Garroni states-
underscore the problem of "question-
ing" in general. Philosophy is the 
thematization of an endless interroga-
tion about knowledge, because it is the 
instance that poses the question: 
"What is a question in general?" But 
such a paradoxical question shouldn't 
be understood as just a verbalistic one; 
and its purpose is not precisely to 
explore the "essence" of questioning. 
"Object or theme of this book" -Gar-
roni writes in the preface-"is the 
'sense', the problem of sense and ex-
perience in general." 
The point is that all knowledge and 
all experience are marked by an in-
stance of comprehension that philo-
sophy, since Socrates-here opposed 
to Thales-and more radically Kant, 
thematizes, disputing in this move-
ment its own legitimacy. But the prob-
lem is not created by philosophy; it is 
already there, and it appears every time 
knowledge and experience, thoughts 
as "processes" more than "systems," 
come into being . So, for example, the 
"progress" of the sciences, the trans-
formation of their paradigms, begins 
with a putting-into-question and a 
thematization of the paradigms them-
selves. The authentic form of philo-
sophy, then, is not an activity of defi-
nition or judgment, but interrogation, 
wonder, as the Greeks very well knew. 
Interrogation, in this sense, is the con-
dition through which the institution, 
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itself. Philosophy is not knowledge 
strictu sensu: it doesn't give definitions 
and, to a certain extent, it is unable to 
give explanations. It is not a privileged 
branch of what we know, because it is 
first of all subsequent and continuous 
putting into question of the already 
constituted knowledge: it is the institu-
tion of a distance through which the 
conditions of possibility of knowledge 
are thematized . Philosophy's problem 
is the problem of the possibility of a 
knowledge. In its most radical move, 
another step back. (we can read in this 
"transcendental" sense Heidegger's 
Schritt zuruck), philosophy faces the 
problem of a philosophical investiga-
tion about knowledge . Philosophy, and 
experience also, are both founded on 
this paradox of self-thematization. The 
"paradox" is basically the double impli-
cation of paradigm and knowledge, im-
plicit and explicit, even unknown and 
known, "earth" and "world" in Heideg-
gerian terms, "sense" and "meaning." 
Every movement of understanding 
comes from the relation between these 
two levels. Experience itself is embed-
ded in this original condition. Gar-
roni' s reflection about the "founding 
paradox" (paradosso fondante), together 
with his distinction between "under-
standing" (intendere) and "com-
prehending" (comprendere) and his per-
sistent reference to common language 
are worthwhile contributions to the re-
thinking of both philosophical and 
everyday experience. 
Yet it is in the second part that the 
investigation develops its best insights, 
in the third chapter titled "Aesthetic 
Comprehension." Here Garroni devel-
ops the Kantian legacy with analyses 
of the interweaving of aesthetics and 
philosophy in thinkers such as Dewey, 
Croce, and again Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger, thinkers that postulate the 
problem of "sense" by means of a 
transcendental reflection of some sort. 
In Garroni' s discussion the aesthetic 
experience exemplarily shows, as al-
ready in Kant, the existence of a prin-
ciple conditioning that Stimmung, that 
"being-already in situation," which is 
preliminary to any possible know-
ledge. Long and dense pages of the 
book are dedicated to the analysis of 
the nature of that "faculty of judg-
ment" which is the keystone of Kant's 
critical arch. The question "What is 
aesthetics?" becomes an internal articu-
lation of the question "What is philo-
sophy?" And in its being related to the 
problem of the "conditions of experi-
ence," before any possible "knowl-
edge," it presents itself in some ways 
as the "most original" (originaria) ques-
tion, in Heideggerian terms . In other 
words: what is fundamental in this re-
flection is the presupposition, in terms 
of "conditions of possibility," of a 
sense--even as a "feeling"-preceding 
and internal to any thinkable meaning. 
Kant's Third Critique, Garroni 
suggests, configures "Aesthetics" not 
as a philosophy of art, but as a 
philosophy of "sense." The "works of 
art" are, in this perspective, only some 
historical phenomena, exemplifying 
that "institution of sense " which 
"opens" the possibility of meaning in 
general. In this formulation Kant is 
very close to Heidegger, and in particu-
lar to Heidegger's famous essay on The 
Origin of the Work of Art, in which art 
is just one of the events of the "setting-
into-work of truth." Here again the 
problem is "sense," considered as ori-
gin and "horizon" of meanings and 
concepts. We are always and since the 
beginning immersed into experience in 
general; art, what we historically call 
"art," has constituted, in a certain tra-
dition, the place in which the determinate 
experience is exemplarily represented 
as revelation. What is at stake here is 
not the "definition" of art but the com-
prehension of the coming-into-being of 
experience, in general and in particu-
lar. We understood better, in this per-
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spective, the use of metaphors of 
"illumination" and "disclosure," both 
in Heidegger and Wittgenstein, to con-
note the happening of sense. An authen-
tic, "transcendental" Aesthetics can be 
thought without referring to any "art" 
whatsoever; its questioning concerns 
comprehension and experience them-
selves. 
Garroni' s readings of Kant, Heideg-
ger and Wittgenstein are provoking 
and original and different from the 
philosophers of "weak thought," 
explicitly criticized in a section of the 
book. His discourse is always well 
articulated and controlled and in its 
conclusions even passionate. Its dif-
ficulties are related to the nature of the 
questions it raises: it states that 
paradox and sense are the two insepar-
able faces of the human condition; it 
stresses the necessity, for an authentic 
comprehension, of radical movements 
of de-familiarization; and puts into 
question the certainties of knowledge 
in general. 
Garroni has returned to the prob-
lems discussed in Senso e paradosso on 
various occasions, among which we 
would like to recall his long essay on 
"Aesthetics and Literary Criticism," 
published in the fourth volume on the 
Letteratura Italiana edited by Alberto 
Asor Rosa (Einaudi, 1987). 
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On the crowded subway, 
making my way 
to the prison to teach 
Black and Puerto Rican inmates 
how to write, 
I think of the fable of the shoemaker 
who struggles 
to make shoes for the oppressed 
while his own go 
barefoot 
over the stones 
(Daniela Gioseffi, in Alfonsi, 217) 
Cintin no'l va a li sagris, pai pafs dal Friul, 
a sunin li ciampanis, no i viulfns pal Friul! 
Co al jot in plassa un puor pierdut in tal Friul 
ghi da la so giacheta dongia ii clfpit di un 
mur, 
co al jot un dai puors ch'a van soj pal Friul 
content ghi da il so cour sotil seil ch' al ven 
scur. 
"Adio mari, adio pari, jo i vai via dal Friul, 
e i vai via ta la Merica, l'aligria dal Friul!" 
Trena, ti l'as puartat viers il mar azur, 
ah se malincunia via dal Friul. 
[Vincent doesn't attend the feasts of the 
Friulan town, 
the bells are ringing, and the violins are not 
playing in the Friuli! 
When he sees in the square a poor soul lost 
in the Friuli, 
he gives him his jacket, near the small warm 
wall, 
when he sees one of the poor souls go by 
lonely through the Friuli, 
he gives him happily his own heart, under 
the darkening sky. 
"Good-bye, Mother, good-bye Father, I am 
leaving the Friuli, 
I am going away to America, the happy land 
of the Friuli!" 
Train, you took him to the blue sea, 
oh what a gloom, far away from the Friuli.] 
(P_ier Paolo Pasolini, in Haller, 266-67) 
